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Prosecutor May Peremptorily Challenge Negroes-Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824. Defendant
was convicted of rape and sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
claims of the improper exclusion of Negroes from
the trial jury. Among those claims was a question
not heretofore examined by the Court in its long
history of cases dealing with the exclusion of
minority groups from state grand and petit juries
-the extent to which a prosecutor may, through
the vehicle of the peremptory challenge, exclude
Negroes from a jury.
In affirming the conviction, the Court distinguished, to a great extent, the rules previously
laid down in cases involving the exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries by state jury
officials. "The essential nature of the peremptory
challenge," the Court said, "is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's control
...

[and,] unlike a challenge for cause, permits

rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is
less easily designated or demonstrable." Since the
challenge "is frequently exercised on grounds
normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings
or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty... the question a prosecutor
or defense counsel must decide is not whether a
juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact
partial, but whether one from a different group is
less likely to be." The Court then concluded that
"the striking of Negroes in a particular case is
[not] a denial of equal protection of the law for
... in the quest for an impartial and qualified jury,
Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are
alike subject to being challenged without cause."
The Court did agree, however, that a showing
that the prosecutor in a particular county, "in
case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or
the victim may be, is responsible for the removal
of Negroes who have been selected as qualified
jurors by the jury commissioners and who have
survived challenges for cause, with the result that
no Negroes ever serve on petit juries" may re-

quire a different result since under "these circumstances, giving even the widest leeway to the
operation of irrational but trial-related suspicions
and antagonisms, it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted."
Confrontation Clause Applies to State TrialsPointer v. Texas, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (1965). In reversing
a Texas robbery conviction, the Supreme Court
of the United States has held that the "Confrontation Clause" of the sixth amendment ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.. .. ") is "a fundamental right and is
made obligatory on the States by the Fourth
Amendment."
During the preliminary hearing held prior to
defendant's trial, the victim testified and identified
defendant as one of the men who had robbed him
at gunpoint. Defendant was not represented by
counsel and did not seek to cross-examine the victim. By the time of trial, the victim had moved to
California and was not available as a witness.
Over the objection of defendant, a transcript of
the victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing
was introduced and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction on the
trial court's holding that he had been "'accorded
the opportunity of cross examining the witnesses
there against him.'"
After declining to decide the broader question of
whether an accused is entitled to the appointment
of counsel at a preliminary hearing which is not,
under state law, a "critical stage in the proceedings" (see White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59), the
Court held that the right to confront the witnesses
includes the right of cross-examination and since
there had been no "full-fledged hearing at which
petitioner had been represented by counsel who
had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine... it follows that use of the
transcript to convict petitioner denied him a constitutional right."
In a companion case, Douglas v. Alabama,
85 S.Ct. 1074 (1965), the Court held that the
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Confrontation Clause was violated when the prosecution, "in the guise of cross-examination to refresh" the recollection of a hostile witness who
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination
when called to testify, read the confession of the
witness (which implicated defendant), preceding
each few questions with the phrase "Did you make
that statement?" Since the invocation of the
privilege by the witness deprived defendant of
the opportunity to effectively cross-examine him,
the Court held, the Confrontation Clause was
violated, even though the reading of the confession
by the prosecutor coupled with the refusal to
answer by the witness was not technically testimaony, since the witness's refusal "created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both
that the statement had been made and that it was
true."
Comment on Defendant's Failure to TestifyGriffin v. California, 85 S.Ct. 1229 (1965). In the
last issue of the Journal, we noted that in the
absence of an authoritative ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme
Court of California had held, in People v. Modesto,
398 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1965), that comment on the
failure of a defendant to testify in a state criminal
ra-e was not forbidden by the fifth amendment.
(See 56 J. CRD. L., C. & P.S. 224.) Now, in
Griffin, the Supreme Court has ruled-such comment is forbidden.
Griffin was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death in California. At his trial, the prosecutor
recounted the evidence against the defendant and
told the jury, in closing argument, that "These
things he has not seen fit to take the stand and
deny or explain." In his instructions to the jury,
the trial judge charged that -the jui'y might take
into account defendant's failure to testify as to
matters which he could reasonably be expected to
deny or explain, and could draw from that failure
inferences unfavorable to the defendant's case.
In reversing, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, said that "comment on the refusal to
testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of
criminal justice' which the Fifth Amendment
outlaws... is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege... [and]
cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly." To the argument of the California court
in the Modesto case (that the jury would draw
unfavorable inferences whether or not instructed
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by the court that they might do so), Mr. Justice
Douglas said that "What the jury may infer given
no help from the court is one thing. What they
may infer when the court solemnizes the silence
of the accused into evidence against him is quite
another."
Comment: Though few states allowed comment
prior to the Griffin opinion, the number of reversals which will flow as a consequence of that decision may mount if it is given retroactive effect.
Although the opinion does not even hint at the
answer, prosecutors and defense counsel will note
that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1964)
requiring the appointment of counsel for indigents
in all felony cases, is probably retroactive (see
Durocler v. LaVallee, 330 j.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 84 S.Ct. 1921), and the Court has.
held that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1965), requiring the suppression in state courts of illegally
obtained evidence, does not affect convictions
final before the date of that ruling. See Linkletter v.
Walker, 85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965). An answer will be
forthcoming sometime in the 1965-1966 Term of
the Court, for certiorarihas been granted in a case
where the parties have been specifically directed to
brief and argue the question of Griffin's retroactivity. Tehan v. Shott, 85 S.Ct. 1650 (1965).
Secondly, in Griffin, the court expressly reserved
the question of whether the fifth amendment
affirmatively compels the giving of an instruction,
at defendant's request, that the jury miust disregard the fact that defendant has not testified.
Though the instruction is commonly given in
state courts where comment has long been forbidden, and in the federal system, Bruno v.
United States, 308 U.S. 287, it has not been
given, of course, in those states where comment
was allowed. The prudent prosecutor, we believe,
would not hereafter object to the giving of such an
instruction in a "comment" state and risk the
reversal of a conviction under an extension of the
rationale of Griffin, though the command of that
case-forbidding comment or instruction on the
failure of a defendant to testify-was followed.
No Forfeiture of Illegally Seized ContrabandOne 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 85
S.Ct. 1246 (1965). In a decision of importance to
prosecutors and defense counsel alike (and even
more important to gamblers) the Supreme Court
of the United States decides that evidence which
is illegally seized, and therefore not admissible in
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criminal cases, may not be forfeited in civil proceedings.
In this case two Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Agents stationed near the New Jersey border saw a
1958 Plymouth sedan bearing Pennsylvania
license plates cross the border bridge headed in
the direction of Philadelphia. The officers observed that the car "was low in the rear, quite
low." After it had proceeded for a short distance
into Pennsylvania, the officers stopped the car
and a search disclosed 31 cases of liquor not
bearing Pennsylvania tax seals.
Although there is no report of a subsequent
criminal prosecution, a petition to forfeit the automobile was filed by the Commonwealth under
statutory authority providing for the forfeiture of
any "vehicle ... used in the... illegal transportation of liquor.. .. " The trial court dismissed
the petition on the ground that the seizure of the
liquor and automobile had been made without
probable cause. This holding was reversed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which decided
that, the issue of probable cause aside, the exclusionary rule which had been fashioned in aid
of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures applied only to
criminal cases. Noting the considerable conflict
among the lower federal and state courts which
have passed on the question, the Supreme Court
granted certiorariand reversed.
The leading case in the field of search and seizure
law, Mr. Justice Goldberg noted in writing for the
Court, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, "was
not a criminal case but was a proceeding by the
United States to forfeit 35 cases of plate glass
which had allegedly been imported without payment of the customs duty." Although the Commonwealth argued that the force of Boyd had been
"undermined" by the decisions in United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 and Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699 (where the Court had said, in dictum,
that the contraband was not to be returned,
though illegally seized), the Court distinguished
those federal criminal cases on the ground that
the contraband involved there (illegally imported
narcotics in Jeffers and an unregistered still,
alcohol and mash in Trupiano) were "objects,
the possession of which, without more, constitutes a
crime. The repossession of such per se contraband
by Jeffers and Trupiano would have subjected
them to criminal penalties." (Emphasis added.)
In the One 1958 Plymouth case, the Court noted,
there is nothing criminal about the ownership

or possession of an automobile and it "is only the
alleged use to which this particular automobile
was put that subjects Mr. McGonigle to its
loss.., and it is conceded here that the Commonwealth could not establish an illegal use
without using the evidence resulting from the
search which is challenged as having been in
violation of the Constitution... [and] the return
of the automobile to the owner would not subject
him to any possible criminal penalties for possession or frustrate a public policy concerning automobiles, as automobiles."
Finally, said Justice Goldberg, "a forfeiture
proceeding is quasi-criminal in character...
[and] its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to
penalize for the commission of an offense against
the law ...and can result in even greater punishment than the criminal prosecution."
Contempt and the Due Process Clause-Holt
v. Virginia, 85 S.Ct. 1375 (1965). The defendants,
both lawyers, filed a petition for change of venue
in a contempt prosecution then pending against
one of them. The petition charged that the trial
judge was "acting as police officer, chief prosecution witness, adverse witness for the defense, grand
jury, chief prosecutor and judge" and that he had
"intimidated" and "harassed" the defendant who
represented his brother lawyer in the contempt
proceeding. The trial judge held that the language
in the petition for change of venue was contemptuous and summarily convicted both counsel of that
offense, imposing a fifty dollar fine. The conviction
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia on the ground that the defendants
had been guilty of violating a statute authorizing
the summary contempt conviction of any person
who uses "'contemptuous or insulting language'
to or about a judge in respect of his official acts."
The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorariand reversed.
Since both the sixth and fourteenth amendments
guaranteed the defendant on whose behalf the
change of venue petition was filed the right to a
fair trial and representation by counsel, the Court
held, the defendants clearly had the right to file a
petition "essential to present claims and raise
relevant issues... [and] it necessarily follows
that motions for change of venue to escape a
biased tribunal raise constitutional issues both
relevant and essential." "Consequently," the
Court said, "neither Dawley nor his counsel
could consistently with due process be convicted
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thority of the warrant, but the Court held that
since the warrant called for the seizure of all
copies of the named books it could not be issued
on the basis of an ex parte hearing before the magistrate. The defendant, the Court said, must be
allowed to participate in the hearing which leads
to the conclusion of obscenity before the warrant
may issue.
Both Marcus and Quantity of Books, the Missouri court noted, "are cases wherein the primary
object was to seek authority to destroy large
quantities of books... [and] the books were seized
and held for a considerable period of time before
there was a proper judicial determination of the
issue of obscenity." The instant case, the court
said, was a criminal prosecution "and hence there
were the usual constitutional protections that are
afforded all defendants in that type of case."
Moreover, prior to the arrest the officers had submitted copies of one of the magazines seized to
Obscenity and the Fourth AmendmentState v. Volltnar, 389 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965). After "two attorneys entrusted with law enforcement
arresting the defendant for the sale of obscene duties and were advised that it was obscene,"
nudist magazines, officers of the St. Louis morality and during the search following the arrest they
squad searched his bookstore for similar material. seized only copies of magazines "similar" to the
Out of "thousands of books and magazines of scrutinized publications. Finally, the court said,
various kinds in the store in question," the officers the total number of magazines seized in the
seized several other nudist publications and these Missouri case amounted only to 44 compared
were admitted in evidence at the trial. Following with 1,715 books seized in the Quantity of Books
conviction, defendant appealed, inter alia," on case and 11,000 books and magazines seized in
the grounds that [1] because the officers had no the Marcus case.
Comment: Prosecutors have been troubled for
search warrant "and were provided with no guide
to the exercise of informed discretion in determin- some time by the effect of the Quantity of Books
ing which magazines were obscene and subject to and Marcus cases upon the validity of currently
seizure" the search violated the first and four- used search and seizure practices in the investigateenth amendments, and [2] the search was "a tion and prosecution of criminal obscenity cases.
general exploratory search for evidence not inci- The problem is two-fold.
First, if Marcus is read as outlawing all warrantdental to the arrest" in violation of the fourth
less
searches in obscenity cases, the police are deand fourteenth amendments.
of an opportunity to gather evidence by
prived
In rejecting these contentions, the Missouri
other
copies of a book or magazine following
seizing
court distinguished Marcus v. Search Warrants,
an arrest without warrant for the sale of such
367 U.S. 717 and Quantity of Books v. Kansas,
material. This evidence is useful not only in per378 U.S. 205. In Marcus, which involved a civil
suading the jury of the seriousness of the offense
forfeiture petition filed to seek the destruction of and the scope of the defendant's operations, but
obscene books, the Supreme Court held that may also be relevant to the question of scienter.
police officers who seized books and magazines It would be incongruous, to say the least, to allow
under the authority of a search warrant calling police officers to arrest without warrant following
only for the seizure of "obscene" material, without the sale to them of a book or magazine which they
further specificity, violated the first amendment believe to be obscene (and no court has outlawed
in relying upon their own judgment of what was this practice) and vet forbid them to take other
obscene. In Quantity oj Books, also a forfeiture copies of the same book or magazine which may
case, the warrant called for the seizure of specific be in plain view on the racks or counter of the
books and the officers did not go beyond the au- store.
for contempt for filing these motions unless it
might be thought that there is something about
the language used which would justify the conviction." (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had
concluded that the motion was " 'a vehicle to
heap insults upon the court, a studied attempt to
smear the judge,'" but the Supreme Court of the
United States held merely that "the words used
in the motions were plain English, in no way offensive in themselves, and wholly appropriate
to charge bias in the community and bias of the
presiding judge." And "if the charges were 'insulting'," the Court concluded, "it was inherent
in the issue of bias raised, an issue which we have
seen had to be raised, according to the charges,
to escape the probability of a constitutionally
unfair trial."
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Second, if both Marcus and Quantity of Books
forbid the seizure of books or magazines not named
in a warrant, even though equivalent to or surpassing in obscene qualities those named, police
are deprived of the opportunity to bring additional
charges for the possession of obscenity (which may
be in open view) and are forbidden to gather
additional evidence to show the character of the
store in a prosecution for the sale or possession
of books named in the search warrant.
Some prosecutors, following the rationale of
the Missouri court, have distinguished the Marcus
and Quantity of Books cases on the grounds that
the Court struck down the practices involved
there on first, not fourth, amendment grounds,
reasoning that an exclusionary rule which would
keep illegally seized books from evidence in a
criminal prosecution has been applied only in
fourth amendment cases and that books seized in
violation of the first amendment may still be
admissible in a criminal prosecution although they
could not be forfeited in a civil hearing.
It seems doubtful, however, that the Supreme
Court would long tolerate the "chilling effect" of
repeated violations-of the first amendment in the
prosecution of obscenity cases merely because the
exclusionary rule has heretofore been invoked
only for the protection of fourth amendment
rights. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 85 S.Ct. 1116,
1120-1121 (1965).
The answer then, it would seem, lies in the conformation of existing search and seizure practices
to the demands of the Marcus and Quantity of
Books cases. Several alternatives are suggested.
First, if books are to be seized without warrant
(as an incident to arrest) or outside the scope of a
warrant (as open contraband), seizure can be
conditioned upon the judgment of a prosecutor who
has some experience and training in the field of
obscenity. This practice has been used in Chicago,
where, on several occasions, Assistant State's
Attornevs have accompanied officers during the
execution of search warrants in bookstores and
books or magazines not named in the warrants
were seized only upon the orders of the attorneys
and not at the discretion of police officers who,
by and large, share the layman's, not the legal,
conception of obscenity.
Second, if the use of search warrants (and consequent prosecution for possession, rather than
sale, of obscenity) is to continue in this field, and
adversary hearings on the question of obscenity
before issuance of the warrant are to be (from the

police standpoint, must be) avoided, perhaps the
answer is to employ warrants which call for the
seizure of only several copies (enough for evidence
purposes) of a named book rather than, as in
Quantity of Books, all copies. This may satisfy
the objection of the Court in Quantity of Books
that an ex parte warrant authorizing the seizure
of all copies of a named publication constitutes
too great an interference with first amendment
freedoms and results in a total exclusion from the
market of material which may be subject to first
amendment protection without the protection of
a speedy and adversary hearing. Cf. Freedman v.
Maryland, 85 S.Ct. 734, 738-739.
In ruling on defendant's appeal, the court
disposed of several other questions of interest to
practitioners in obscenity cases. On the merits of
the obscenity issue, the court ruled that several
current nudist magazines were obscene despite
earlier holdings of the Supreme Court that particular nudist magazines then published were not
obscene. In the instant appeal, the court noted
that the photographs "clearly depict both male
and female genitalia, including the pubic hair...
[and that] predominating in all of these publications are close-up photographs of attractive,
shapely, young women,... posed so as to portray
both the face and figure of these women in a most
alluring manner,... a considerable number of the
photographs are in color... [and include] a closeup photograph of a young man and young woman
facing the camera with the sex organ of the male
in a condition of erection."
The court also held that the defendant was not
insulated from knowledge of the nature of the
material on the ground that he "could not have
known that the magazines were obscene until
there had been a prior adversary proceeding establishing such 'obscenity" and that proof that
[1] he told the officers that there were pictures of
"some real nude women" in one of the publications,
and [2] nude pictures were shown on the front and
back covers of all the magazines involved sufficed
to show scienter.
On the subject of expert witnesses in obscenity
cases, the court held that expert testimony on
the question of contemporary community standards and the obscenity of the particular material
was inadmissible, although the court intimated
that expert testimony on the question of "the
literary or artistic value of publications alleged to
be obscene" was permissible.
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Defendant Entitled To Counsel at Preliminary
Hearing-Harris v. Wilson, 239 F. Supp. 204
(N.D.Cal. 1965). Passing upon the question reserved by the Supreme Court in the Pointer case
(abstracted above), the court in the instant case
becomes the first to hold that "the federal constitutional right to counsel attaches at the" preliminary hearing, at least in California.
Prior Supreme Court decisions have extended
the right to counsel to preliminary hearings in
state criminal cases only if the hearings constitute
a "critical stage" in the proceedings against the
defendant. (See, for example, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368. U.S, 52 and White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59.) The "critical stage," however, has heretofore been •interpreted to include preliminary
hearings only when special defenses must be
raised at that time or forever lost, or when some
special event (e.g., a plea of guilty) occurs which
operates to the disadvantage of a defendant at
his subsequent trial on the indictment.
In holding preliminary hearings to be included
within the critical stage regardless of the special
considerations found in prior cases, the District
Court was persuaded by the following considerations.
First, the court said, "Counsel must be assigned
at a time when it might be helpful in investigating
and preparing for the case... [and it] could
hardly be denied that it is vital to any defendant's
interest to have some information about the
strength of his case before he makes up his mind
how to plead."
Second, "the most convincing reason that presence of defense counsel at Preliminary Examination might 'affect the whole trial' is the fact that
the Examination is an initial adversary confrontation. The rest of the judicial proceedings can
be completely avoided if the defendant achieves a
victori'at this stage."
Third, the preliminary hearing constitutes a
stage "where counsel is most helpful because...
'incompetent evidence received without objection
may be given its full probative effect... land]
prosecution witnesses may be cross-examined and
the defense may proffer its own witnesses."
Fourth, the preliminary hearing "is a species of
criminal pre-trial discovery."
Comment: The court in this case reaches the
,,inclusion that several state supreme courts have
rejected since the opinion of the Supreme Court
in the Gideon case. If this opinion becomes the
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law generally and, like Gideon, is held to have
retroactive effect, those states in which counsel
has always been appointed for indigent defendants
at the indictment, but not the preliminary hearing,
stage may see the penitentiary doors swung wide
to the same extent, and, perhaps to a greater
extent, as those states which, prior to Gideon,
did not furnish counsel at the trial to indigent
defendants in felony cases.
Accessories and the Hearsay Rule-People v.
Tunnacliff, 134 N.W.2d 682 (Mich. 1965). Suppose that A is on trial for the crime of burglary.
The proof, including his own confession, shows
that he aided and abetted B in the commission
of the crime by telling B the best way to enter the
burglarized premises. There is, however, no proof
that B actually committed the offense of burglary
except B's confession which he now repudiates,
which was made outside the presence of A (thus
eliminating any possibility of an admission by
silence or an adoptive admission), and which is
now related by a third party. Although the confession of B now related in the trial of A would
clearly be hearsay as direct evidence of A's guilt,
is it admissible on the theory that it is only being
used to prove the commission of the crime by B,
the corpus delicti, while proof of A's guilt as an
accessory to B's crime is made by other competent
evidence? Ruling on this question for the first
time, the Supreme Court of Michigan, by a
split decision, joins those courts who have held
such evidence inadmissible.
The rationale for the admission of such testimony despite its obvious hearsay character is that
[1] it is being used only for a limited purpose, i.e.,
to establish that the declarant was guilty,of an
offense as a principal,[2] such testimony is worthy
of credit since, as to the declarant, it is a statement
against interest not likely to be made unless
true, and [3] the guilt of the defendant as an accessory to the declarant's crime must still be shown by
competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority of the Michigan Supreme Court
refused to follow this reasoning, however, in the
instant case where the defendant, a policeman,
was charged with having been the accessory to
the commission of a burglary by one Mahar.
Although defendant admitting counseling Mahar
on how to gain entrance to the burglarized premises, there was no proof that it was Mahar who
committed the burglary in question except for the
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testimony of the witness Smith (then in jail
charged with an offense) that Mahar told him,
out of the presence of the defendant Tunnacliff,
that he had committed the burglary. Following
the early, and leading, case of Ogden v. State, 12
Wis. 532, 78 Am. Dec. 754, the court noted that
though Mahar's statement was a declaration
against his interest, still there was the possibility
that "being innocent, and believing that his personal safety would not thereby be endangered,
[he] might make... [the confession], from feelings
of ill-will and hatred to [the defendant] for the
sole purpose of deceiving and misleading others.
... " And the confession was still subject to the
classical defaults of hearsay evidence, noted the
court, since it was "made privately... without
the sanction of an oath... subjected to no crossexamination" and without the opportunity for
inquiry into the motive of the declarant.
Comment: Though the majority opinion rejecting the confession of the principal as competent proof (at the trial of the accessory) of the
principal's guilt does not so state directly, it is
hard to read the opinion without assuming that
the court was influenced by the following factors:
(1) the principal had not been (so far as the record
showed) tried for or convicted of the offense, (2)
Mahar, the principal, had denied making the confession in issue, (3) the confession was related by a
man who was then in custody and "charged with a
most serious offense" and whose possible motives
for falsification were therefore obvious.
- Of course, all these factors bear heavily upon
the weight or the credibility to be attached to the
confession as evidence of the commission by the
principal of the offense of burglary and, presumably, the jury, which was explicitly and adequately
instructed on these points, took them into account.
They do not furnish a satisfactory reason, however, for finding the evidence incompetent. Balancing the notion that a confession to a crime is not
likely to be made unless true against the possibility
that an innocent man will confess to a crime which
he did not commit in order to implicate another
as an accessory, though the confession does not
name the accessory, I believe that the majority
opinion of the Michigan court in the instant case
is unfortunately retrogressive. See Wigmore, Evidence §1079(c)(3d ed.1940).
Defendant Shackled For Trial-People v.
Thomas, 134 N.W.2d 352 (Ct.App., Mich. 1965).

Indicted for escaping from prison, the defendant
was brought to the court-room and tried in front
of a jury while "in prison uniform and in chains."
After conviction, he appealed on the ground that
his appearance during the trial prejudiced the
jury to the extent that a fair trial was impossible.
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Michigan.
While the appellate court recognized that "it
would have been better in this case if appellant
had been brought into court in civilian clothes and
unchained" and that "the action of the trial court
in so chaining appellant during the trial is not
recommended," it held the question was one for
the discretion of the trial court, especially in view
of the fact that defendant had once escaped
from prison and it was therefore understandable
that the trial court would act with caution in the
matter of defendant's custody.
Telephone Booth is Building-Perry v. State,
174 So.2d 55 (Ct.App., Fla. 1965). Defendant was
tried for the burglary of three outdoor telephone
booths and convicted. On appeal, he contended
that a telephone booth was not a "building"
within the meaning of the Florida burglary statute.
The conviction was affirmed.
The District Court of Appeal recognized that
another Florida appellate court, in construing the
same statute, had held that telephone booths
which were located within other buildings were
not themselves buildings, but "closets." This case
was distinguished, however, on the ground that
the booths involved in the instant case were
built outdoors and fell within the commonly
accepted dictionary meaning of the word building,
i.e., an "edifice, framed or constructed, designed
to stand more or less permanently, and covering a
space of land, for... [a] useful purpose." In addition, the court was persuaded by prior decisions
from California and Colorado which had reached
the same result.
Defendant Cannot Claim Fifth AmendmentState v. Manning, 1-34 N.W.2d 91 N.D. 1965).
In art interesting opinion, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota has ruled that when a defendant
testifies in a criminal case, he cannot refuse to
answer certain questions asked on cross-examination though the answers would tend to incriminate
him in a collateral criminal proceeding.
Defendant was tried for the offense of failure to
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render assistance and for leaving the scene of an
automobile accident. Under cross-examination,
he objected to certain questions relating to his
consumption of alcoholic beverages before the
accident on the ground that the answers would
tend to incriminate him in a prosecution for driving
while intoxicated which was then pending. His
objections were overruled and a conviction followed.
While reversing on other grounds, the supreme
court held proper the trial court's order compelling
defendant to answer the incriminating questions,
ruling that a defendant who takes the witness
stand becomes the same as any other witness
and must answer "any relevant and proper question on cross-examination, the answer to which
will tend to convict him of the crime for which
he is being tried, even though such answer may
also incriminate him of a collateral crime." Refusal to answer collaterally incriminating questions, the court said, would be justified only if
"the answers to the questions objected to would
not tend to establish the guilt of the accused of
the crime for which he was being tried."
Forced Speech Not Incriminating-State v. King,
209 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1965). In a unanimous opinion,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey has decided
that forcing the defendant, a suspect in a police
lineup, to repeat the words used by a robber did
not violate his privilege against self-incrimination
even though the spoken words made positive the
identification of defendant by his victim who
attended the lineup and heard him speak.
The privilege against self-incrimination, the
court held, arose as a "reaction to the practice in
the early English courts of compelling a witness
to be sworn and give testimony concerning his
guilt or innocence." Repeating words in a police
lineup, said the court, fell within the scope of
those things which have been held by other courts
to be "non-testimonial" in character, e.g:, fingerprinting, photographirng, physical examinations,
drunkometer tests and blood tests, all of which
may be compelled "since to do so does not require
the witness to disclose any knowledge he may
have."
Lineup Identification of Indigent Defendant.
Valid-Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498
(D.C.Penn. 1965). In a novel opinion, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has

concluded that the practice of putting an indigent
defendant into police lineups does not violate the
federal constitution though the defendant could
not have been made to participate in the lineup
if he had possessed the funds with which to make
bail while awaiting trial.
Defendant was charged with burglary, and
because his bail was set at the sum of $10,000,
which he did not possess, he was committed to
jail to await trial. While in the jail, the police
proposed to place him in a lineup "for possible
identification by the victim of a rape and burglary
unrelated to the charges on which he ...

[was]

then being held." Defendant, to prevent the lineup, sued the police department under the federal
civil rights act (42 U.S.C.A. §1983) for an injunction claiming a violation of equal protection of
the law since "he is in custody only because he is
too poor to pay for bail and, in consequence, he
is subject to being placed in a lineup while those
who are free on bail are not and since this difference in treatments is based on his indigency,
it constitutes invidious discrimination." Defendant also claimed that the lineup, during-which he
may be "made to move about and to speak,"
violated his privilege against self-incrimination and
the due process clause. The latter argument was
based on the rationale that, if free, it would be a
violation of due process (incorporating the fourth
amendment) for the police to take him into custody
without probable cause for the purpose of placing
him into a police lineup, and, although imprisoned
for other crimes, he was "free" with respect to the
crimes with which he had not been charged.
In rejecting defendant's constitutional arguments, the court held that the equal protection
of the law was not violated because the classifition of the indigent who cannot make pre-trial
bail "is not only constitutionally permissible, it is
expressly provided and guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution...
[and] since it is constitutionally sanctioned, the
classification cannot be made the basis for a
charge of discrimination." Further, the court held,
"it is clear that the privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit the use of a defendant's
body as evidence during a trial ... [and it therefore follows that it does not] prevent the viewing
in a police lineup of a suspect under arrest, since
such bodily view does not require the accused to
be an unwilling witness against himself." In ruling
against the due process claim, the court held
that defendant was simply not "free" with respect
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to the crimes for which he was not charged because
he was in custody for others and that transferring
him, temporarily, from a cell to a lineup room
within the prison did not constitute an "arrest'
without probable cause.

legislative classification was contrary to the scientific principle that marijuana causes neither
"physical [n]or psychological addiction."
The trial court ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court of Colorado which held, in accordance
with prior decisions in sister jurisdictions, that
the classification of narcotic drugs adopted by the
legislature was reasonable despite what the court
termed "differences of opinion" concerning the
addictive qualities of marijuana. The court noted
that the "important and pivotal consideration is
whether the classification bears a reasonable
relation 'to the public purpose sought to be
achieved'" and that "the use of marijuana and
other drugs identified in the Colorado statute
presents a danger to the public safety and welfare
of the community since they are clearly related
to each other and to the commission of crime."
(Emphasis added.)

Officer Qualified in Breathalyzer Test-State
v. Brown, 209 A.2d 324 (Vt. 1965). Declining to
follow a contrary opinion of the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island (State v. Gregoire, 148 A.2d 751),
the Supreme Court of Vermont holds that a
police officer who has had three hours of instruction in the operation of a "photo-electric intoximeter" given by the inventor of the device, and who
has made tests with the machine on twenty-four
prior occasions, is sufficiently qualified to testify
as an expert witness in a prosecution for driving
while intoxicated. And in affirming defendant's
conviction, the court also held that testimony of a
defense expert witness, a pathologist, that "as
many as 16% of persons having a blood alcohol
Evidence Chain Incomplete-Jones v. Forrest
content of 0.20 would not show the effects of in- City, 388 S.W.2d 386 (Ark. 1965). In reversing a
toxicants," did not rebut the legislative presump- conviction for driving while intoxicated, the
tion of intoxication (for readings of 0.15 and Supreme Court of Arkansas holds incomplete the
above) when the testimony was not related to the evidence necessary to establish a foundation for
defendant in any way and there was no showing testimony concerning the results of an analysis
that he belonged to the 16 per cent classification. of a urine sample. The sample, after being given
by the defendant in the police station, was placed
Expert Arson Testimony Admissible-State v. in a bottle in a room in the station and tagged
Tuernbough, 388 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1965). The with the name of an officer investigating the case.
defendants were convicted of the crime of arson The technician came to the police station, picked
and appealed on the ground, inter alia, that it was up a bottle in the same room, with the same name
error to allow the fire chief to "testify as to the attached, and made the analysis. Since there was
origin of the fire, and the intensity of the heat." no "testimony that the bottle was sealed, and,
In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court of course, there was no 'hand to hand' or direct
of Missouri, noting that the witness had been a transmittal of the specimen" to the technician, and
member of the fire department for thirty years, because no one could testify positively that the
"had witnessed near to 1,000 fires and had taken specimen given was the same as that analyzed,
courses in fire fighting at the University of Mis- the court held the foundation testimony insuffisouri," held the witness to be qualified as an ex- cient.
pert and, since he had observed the fire while it
was burning, allowed such opinion testimony to
Discovery of Lie Test Results Allowed-Balbe given in the discretion of the trial judge.
lard v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rep. 291 (Cal.App.
1965). The defendant, a doctor, was charged with
Narcotic Act is Constitutional-People v. Stark, the crime of rape. Prior to trial, he sought, in a
400 P.2d 923 (Colo. 1965). On appeal from the discovery proceeding, the results of lie tests given
ruling of the trial court in holding unconstitutional to the complaining witness by the police. The
the narcotic drug act of the state of Colorado, trial court refused to grant discovery of the results
defendant, in support of the trial court's judgment, and defendant sought a writ of mandate from the
argued that the inclusion of cannabis, or mari- appellate court to compel discovery. The appellate
juana, within the classification of a narcotic drug court granted the writ.
denied defendant due process of law because such
An important question in the case to be tried,
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the court held, was whether certain admissions
made by the doctor to the complainant (which
were recorded with the cooperation of the police),
were admissible in evidence under the rule of
People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361. That case prohibits evidence of confessions or admissions made
by a "focal suspect" who has not been warned
of his privilege against self-incrimination or his
right to counsel. Since this question would turn
on whether the police, when they made the recordings, had sufficient cause to suspect defendant
of the crime (thus making him a focal suspect),
or whether they were merely conducting a "general inquiry into an unsolved crime," the court
reasoned that the lie test results would "appear
to be the main objective information available
to the petitioner on the officers' state of mind at
the time the conversations were recorded." Because the court found it "difficult to distinguish
the defendant's right to discover the prosecution
expert's opinion based on an evaluation of physical evidence (clearly allowable) from discovery of
his opinion concerning a complaining witness'
veracity based on an evaluation of physical responses recorded on a p machine," discovery of'
the lie test results was permitted.
Probation Revoked on Hearsay EvidenceScott v. State, 208 A.2d 575 (Md. 1965). The
defendant was convicted of robbery and placed
on probation. Thereafter he was charged with
assault with intent to rape, tried and acquitted
when the only witness linking defenddnt to the
offense (his mother identified as his the hat recovered by the victim at the scene of the crime)
recanted and refused to testify. After the acquittal,
the trial court, acting, on the hearsay testimony he
had refused to receive at the trial of the assault
case (the police officer's testimony that the mother,
prior to trial, had identified the hat as defendant's),
revoked defendant's probation in the robbery
case.
The probation revocation was affirmed by the
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Court of Appeals of Maryland which held that
"probation is a matter of grace.., that... may
be ended, if the court is reasonably persuaded,
by knowledge of facts, even if obtained more
informally than the rules of evidence would permit... [them] to be obtained in a trial... including hearsay (provided that information not
received from or in the presence of the defendant
should be called to his attention so that he has
the opportunity to refute, discredit or explain
it.'
Narcotic Defendant Entitled to Own ExpertState v. Johnson, 208 A.2d 444 N.J.Cty.Ct. 1965).
The defendant was tried for being under the influence of a narcotic drug. At the trial, the state
offered the opinion of the police department physician, who had examined defendant after his arrest, that the scratches on his arm appeared to
be puncture wounds and that defendant was
then under the influence of a drug. Defendant
testified that he had requested that a physician
of his choice be called to examine him, which
request was denied by the police, and explained
that the scratches were incurred in his work as a
tree surgeon. Defendant was convicted.
In reversing the conviction, the appellate court
held that it was a denial of due process to hold the
defendant for twenty-six hours after his arrest
without allowing him to arrange for an examination
by a private physician, since this resulted in the
denial of an opportunity to prepare a defense to
the charge. "Possibly a physician of defendant's
own choosing might have had a different opinion
than that of the police physician," the court
said, but unless "withdrawal symptoms were
evident, the passage of a substantial period of
time such as the 26-hour period defendant was
held, would probably make it more difficult for a
physician to formulate an opinion of defendant's
condition at the time of his arrest ... [and this]
was fundamentally unfair."

